Saturday, November 23, 2013

PIECE PROCESS IRELAND WITHOUT TRUTH JUSTICE RECONCILIATION







A proposal by Attorney-General John Larkin that there be an end to prosecutions for the conflict up to 1998, has drawn a sharply negative response from almost all sides. Clearly the political will is not there and all of the important players are not at the table. The mentored politicians are not prepared to make personal sacrifices and are afraid of the truth.

Irish Republican News 
07:19 (6 hours ago)
to me
    IRISH REPUBLICAN NEWS
    http://republican-news.org

    Friday-Thursday, 15-21 November, 2013


1.  THE MURDER AND REPRESSION FORCE
2.  Death of a peacemaker
3.  Justice campaigns make progress
4.  Wave of anger greets call to end prosecutions
5.  Talks face deadline as issues bear down
6.  Alerts and hoaxes continue
7.  Feature: 'Britain's Secret Terror Force'
8.  Feature: Address to 32 County Sovereignty Movement Ard Fheis


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THE MURDER AND REPRESSION FORCE


 A BBC Panorama documentary in which former plain-clothes British
 soldiers admitted carrying out undercover gun attacks in nationalist
 west Belfast has led to a public outcry and demands for an inquiry.

 The details revealed in the broadcast have recalled traumatic and
 appalling events which have always been refuted by the British
 authorities.

 Dozens of innocent civilians were injured or killed in attacks carried
 out by the 'Military Reaction Force' (MRF), usually in machine-gun
 blasts from an unmarked vehicle, and always the full sanction and
 support of their British military bosses.

 Reconstructions of events dating from 1971 onwards have hone a new light
 on the actions of the secretive unit. The BBC's John Ware interviewed
 members of the MRF, who wore disguise but still spoke of their pride in
 their murderous campaign.

 The documentary recounted incidents when machine gun fire raked through
 knots of people standing on street corners or heading home to the pub.
 Others were chased through streets.

 Those targeted were often standing in the vicinity of road barricades
 erected by nationalist communities for their own safety 40 years ago.
 All of the victims were forensically tested by the then RUC, but none
 were found to have been in contact with firearms. No evidence was ever
 presented that those who were shot were anything other than innocent
 civilians.

 It was argued in the broadcast that the unit was a prototype
 counter-insurgency operation based on experiences in colonial conflicts,
 and that military regulations or civil laws "did not apply".

 The unit included 40 hand-picked men from across the British Army who
 always wore plain clothes.  When the men arrived at the specialised
 enclosure in Palace Barracks, County Down, which still operates today,
 the men dispensed with ranks, identification tags and surnames.

 Some soldiers told the broadcaster they would drive by the barricades
 and open fire, even if they did not see anybody brandishing a gun.

 One said anyone standing in the vicinity of a barricade was potentially
 an armed member of the IRA, and therefore a justifiable target. Another
 said it was part of his mission to "draw out" the IRA in west Belfast.
 "If they needed shooting they'd be shot," he said.

 Most admitted that they would shoot unarmed targets. One said: "We were
 not there to act like an Army unit, we were there to act like a terror
 group".

 MRF member Simon Cursey - not his real name - told a newspaper at the
 weekend that originally they were told to shoot at anyone carrying a
 weapon, but that the rules changed so that "groups manning barricades or
 vigilantes patrolling late at night" were targets.

 He admitted involvement in the attack in which father-of-six Patrick
 McVeigh died. That attack, and another six weeks later, were both
 carried out from an unmarked car using a privately-owned Thompson
 submachine gun.

  Key information was withheld from courts in the north of Ireland about
  this unit's activities, according to Panorama. Mr McVeigh's daughter
  Patricia said of the broadcast: "We want the truth. We don't want to
  stop until we get the truth."

 The MRF was ultimately replaced by the Force Research Unit, an equally
 clandestine division of the British Army which operated in concert with
 loyalist paramilitary death squads.

 Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams said the programme had shed light on one
 aspect of Britain's 'Dirty War' in Ireland, and said victims of the MRF
 would be "disturbed" by the new information.

 He called on the Dublin government to press the British to establish "a
 truth recovery process that can provide support and closure for
 survivors".

 "Sinn Fein has proposed that there be an international, independent
 truth recovery process," he said. "Others have different ideas and that
 is fair enough, but we need to take this opportunity to move the process
 forward in a way that looks after the victims but also builds the future
 for the survivors."


----------------------------------------------------------------------


>>>>>> Death of a peacemaker


 Fr Alec Reid, who was a significant figure during the initial peace
 process in Ireland, died this [Friday] morning, aged 82.

 A native of County Tipperary, he died peacefully in a Dublin hospital,
 his Redemptorist Order said.

 The influence of Fr Reid and his Catholic teachings are often credited
 with encouraging Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams towards peace at what was
 then a very difficult time in the conflict.

 Fr Reid also facilitated talks in the late 1980s between the SDLP leader
 John Hume and Mr Adams which created the conditions for the first
 ceasefire by the Provisional IRA in 1994. His Redemptorist monastery in
 Clonard in west Belfast was the venue for much of the Hume-Adams talks
 and for other secret peace process negotiations.

 Fr Reid was present in 1988 when mourners were attacked and killed in
 Milltown Cemetery at the funeral of three IRA Volunteers who had been
 ambushed by the SAS. He was famously pictured administering the last
 rites to two British soldiers captured and killed by the IRA after they
 were found spying on a subsequent republican funeral.

 British Direct Ruler Theresa Villiers said: "We all owe a debt of
 gratitude to him for the role he played in the peace and reconciliation
 process in Northern Ireland. "

 Former SDLP leader John Hume said he was deeply saddened by the death of
 his friend.

 In a statement, Mr Hume said: "Fr Reid was a pillar of the peace
 process. Without his courage, determination and utter selflessness, the
 road to peace in our region would have been much longer and much more
 difficult to traverse. A man of faith and deep conviction, his
 commitment to our people was a key part of the foundation on which our
 early, fragile peace was built.

 "Fr Alec was not simply a 'go between' in the early days of negotiating
 for peace. He was an active player in fighting for an end to violence.

 "While we mourn the loss of a great man, we must also celebrate the
 legacy of peace and an opportunity to reconcile our people that he gave
 to us. It is an opportunity we cannot afford to waste."

 Mr Adams said Fr Reid's base in west Belfast during the height of the
 conflict, Clonard, had been the cradle of the peace process.

 "I feel deeply saddened. I have not absorbed it yet. I knew him for the
 last 40 years," he said.

 "He was also a very good friend of mine, of my wife, of my family. What
 Alec Reid did was he lived the gospel message. He developed a view which
 was contrary to the official view, that there had to be dialogue, and he
 was tenacious -- I remember quite a few times saying he was like a
 terrier."

 He said that Fr Reid had "worked tirelessly" for all the people of
 Belfast and was "unstinting" in his efforts for peace.

 "In the 1970's along with Fr. Des Wilson he acted as a facilitator to
 end inter republican conflicts. They also started a dialogue with
 loyalist paramilitaries.

 "Alec was a friend to the republican prisoners and especially those
 involved in the H Block and Armagh prison protests and hunger strikes
 and their families."

 "He and I had many discussions about the conflict, its causes and how it
 might be ended. Out of those conversations emerged a commitment to
 dialogue as the first necessary step along that process and a
 commencement of a process in the early 1980s to commence a process of
 dialogue with the Catholic Hierarchy, SDLP leader John Hume and the
 Irish and British governments.

 "Fr Reid was tenacious in his pursuit of peace. He wrote copious letters
 to political leaders here and in Britain and engaged in countless
 meetings with politicians and government's seeking to persuade them to
 start the process of talking. He saw good in everyone and lived the
 gospel message. His was the gospel of the streets."

 Fr Reid's remains will repose at Marianella Chapel, 75 Orwell Road,
 Dublin 6 tomorrow from 2pm - 8pm and on Sunday from 1pm - 8pm. Mass will
 be held in the chapel at 11 am on Monday after which his remains will be
 taken to Clonard. An ecumenical Service of Gratitude for Fr Reid's life
 and ministry will take place at 7.30 pm in Clonard Church. His funeral
 Mass will be at 12 noon in Clonard Church on Wednesday.


----------------------------------------------------------------------


>>>>>> Truth campaigns make progress


 An edited version of a report into the McGurk's Bar massacre is to be
 disclosed to the victims' families within two weeks, the PSNI has told
 the High Court in Belfast.

 Counsel for PSNI Baggott confirmed that a version of the Historical
 Enquiries Team (HET) review of the McGurk's Bar massacre is to be handed
 over.

 It is not yet clear to what extent the report will be redacted or
 censored, but the announcement was strongly welcomed by the families of
 the victims.

 Fifteen people were murdered when the north Belfast pub was blown up by
 the loyalist UVF in December 1971. The attack was described as an 'IRA
 own goal' by the Crown forces, a claim which was soon exposed as a lie.

 One of those bereaved had sought a judicial review against the PSNI
 stance, arguing that it had a public law duty to disclose the report
 without delay.

 The legal challenge, brought by Bridget Irvine, whose mother Kitty was
 among those killed, contended that the failure to hand the dossier over
 was irrational, unlawful and breaches human rights.

 Lawyers for the PSNI had sought more time to consider whether to release
 a redacted form of the report. But in court this week, barrister Peter
 Coll for the PSNI said that "a finalised version" of the HET review
 summary report would be released within two weeks.

 GLENANNE ACTION

 In other news, families of 20 people killed by a gang that contained
 members of the Crown forces and loyalist paramilitaries are set to take
 legal action against the British government and the PSNI.

 The authorities knew about the activities of the UVF/RUC/UDR gang based
 at a farm in Glenanne, south Armagh, which carried out 120 murders on
 both sides of the border during the early 1970s, but failed to prevent
 the attacks.

 The families say the evidence of collusion between the Crown forces and
 paramilitaries is overwhelming. They are suing for damages, alleging a
 failure by the British government, its Ministry of Defence and the RUC
 (now PSNI) police to fulfill their legal duties to protect life and take
 action against those involved.

 Their lawyer, Peter Corrigan, said: "These cases are taken against a
 background of a continued failure by the state to front up on its role
 in facilitating collusion in mid-Ulster in one of the darkest periods of
 the conflict here."

 UVF DISCLOSURE

 Meanwhile, the sister of a man murdered by the UVF yesterday cleared the
 first stage in her High Court battle to secure disclosure of a full
 report on the shooting.

 Bobby Moffett was gunned down in front of shoppers on west Belfast's
 Shankill Road in May 2010.

 The now defunct 'Independent Monitoring Commission' (IMC), the body set
 up to scrutinise loyalist and IRA activity, found that the UVF's
 leadership had sanctioned the 43-year-old's killing.

 In its report the international body described the killing as a public
 execution ordered to stop him from flouting UVF authority -- and to send
 a message to the community that this authority was not to be challenged.

 Mr Moffett's sister, Irene Owens, was this week granted leave to seek a
 judicial review which would compel the British government to release the
 dossier to the coroner in full.

 JOURNALS DESTROYED

 But in other news, a former member of the RUC Special Branch has said he
 has destroyed his police journals and diaries in order "to stop them
 falling into the wrong hands".

 The man, who was granted anonymity and is known only as 'P3', was
 testifying at the inquest into the murder of pensioner Roseann Mallon.
 Ms Mallon's house was under blanket British Army surveillance when it
 was raked with gunfire, in an attack blamed on loyalist paramilitaries.

 The inquest has already heard overwhelming evidence of Crown force
 collusion in the killing.

 'P3' was the most senior figure in the special RUC 'intelligence'
 division in Dungannon, County Tyrone, at the time of Ms Mallon's murder.
 He said he "never considered" the police journals might be used for
 trials or inquest hearings.

 "There was no requirement - I never even thought about it," he said. The
 inquest, now in its third week, will continue on Monday.


----------------------------------------------------------------------


>>>>>> Wave of anger greets call to end prosecutions


 A proposal by Six-County Attorney-General John Larkin that there should
 be an end to prosecutions for the conflict up to 1998, the signing of
 the Good Friday Agreement, has drawn a sharply negative response from
 almost all sides.

 Despite an overwhelmingly negative response from politicians and
 victims' groups, Larkin has remained defiant, saying the call has
 fueled a debate on how the issue of the past should be dealt with.

  "No minister, no MLA is engaged in what I said," he said later. "It's
  entirely my contribution, independent, to the public debate."

 He added: "I have put it out there and it's being discussed."

 Later in the week he held talks with US mediator Richard Haass as part
 of a series of high-level political discussions focussing on the issues
 of dealing with the past, sectarian parades, and flags and symbols.

 Mr Larkin was speaking as documents were being received by his office
 detailing the illegal and highly controversial actions of the MRF
 British Army death squad in the early 1970s.

 But his remarks drew an immediate and near-hysterical response from
 unionists. Nationalists noted with concern that his comments avoided
 reference to the need for a truth recovery process.

 Larkin's office is tasked with advising the Six-County administration on
 legal matters and to supervise the rule of law in the North of Ireland,
 and his political interventions have previously raised eyebrows at
 Stormont.

 The Alliance Party said the proposals were an attempt to "sweep the past
 under the carpet", while Jim Allister, leader of the hardline unionist
 TUV, said he was "appalled and angered".

 DUP MP Jeffrey Donaldson said the proposal would set an "extremely
 dangerous precedent not just in the UK but across the free world".

 Alban Maginness of the SDLP said the remarks were a "cause of real
 concern" and victims and survivors were "entitled to justice
 irrespective of the lapse of time".

 Ulster Unionist leader Mike Nesbitt said he couldn't believe he didn't
 understand the "hurt and pain" he would cause amongst victims".

 A spokesperson for Relatives for Justice, which represents victims of
 state killings, said the proposal was "repugnant, incompatible and
 dangerous".

 Sinn Fein's Gerry Adams did not condemn Mr Larkin's suggestions but
 insisted a wider debate on the past was needed. He said the voices of
 the victims' "must be heard and respected".

 His party colleague Gerry Kelly added that "if what John Larkin is doing
 is drawing a line in the sand and closing down the ability to bring out
 truth, then I would fundamentally disagree."

 British prime minister David Cameron also quickly moved to distance
 himself from Mr Larkin's remarks, saying such a move would be "rather
 dangerous".

 "I do think it's important to allow Richard Haass to do his work about
 parades, about flags, and about dealing with the past," he told the
 House of Commons.


----------------------------------------------------------------------


>>>>>> Talks face deadline as issues bear down


 With tensions again rising in the north of Ireland, US mediator Richard
 Haass held a round-table meeting of the five main Stormont parties today
 [Friday] on the three key issues of sectarian parades, flags and
 symbols, and the legacy of the past.

 Mr Haass returned to the United States after the meeting, but will
 return to Ireland in December for possibly the final phase of talks.

 Today's talks were the third round of discussions between Haass and the
 Stormont parties.  The US diplomat described them as "serious,
 thoughtful and creative". He said he still believed they could find a
 consensus before the end of the year.

 Mr Haass said he had been "affected" by his meetings with groups of
 victims. "Speaking if you will, personally rather than professionally,
 it is impossible to come away from these meetings with victim and
 survivor groups and not be affected," he said.

 Over the past two months the former special envoy and his team have met
 between 50 and 60 interest groups and have received around 500
 submissions to an online consultation.

 On this visit, the diplomat also met the Bloody Sunday relatives and
 other groups in Derry, while his team held talks with the Protestant
 Orange Order and nationalist residents groups in Portadown and Belfast.

 And despite a definitive statement by the Police Federation (which
 represents members of the PSNI) that the UVF has "come off ceasefire", a
 colleague of Mr Haass met with senior members of that organisation.

 Meghan Sullivan held talks at a loyalist protest camp at Twaddell
 Avenue. The camp has continued since the Parades Commission banned a
 sectarian parade from passing through republican Ardoyne on the evening
 of the Twelfth of July.

 Although illegal, an encampment of loyalists still demanding to march
 through Ardoyne has been allowed to remain in place for over five months
 now. Loyalists are again feared to be orchestrating large-scale
 disturbances in the run-up to Christmas.

 Leading flag protester Jamie Bryson insisted that demonstrations planned
 for Tuesday December 3 -- the first anniversary of the decision by
 Belfast City Council to limit the flying of the flag to designated days
 -- would be "peaceful civil rights protests"

 However, the demonstrations are expected to be held at 6pm, which will
 coincide with rush-hour traffic.  Last year, similar flag-protest
 demonstrations served as roadblocks which brought Belfast to a virtual
 standstill.

 A loyalist march through Belfast city centre on Saturday November 30 --
 with up to 10,000 participants and 40 bands -- has also been organised
 to mark the first anniversary of the Belfast City Council decision. The
 Parades Commission and the PSNI have give permission to the parade, but
 have been unwilling to reveal the identity of the organiser. Permission
 has also been sought by loyalists for another flag protest on Saturday
 December 14.

 Belfast Sinn Fein councillor JJ Magee slammed the plans. "Political
 unionism needs to put a stop to these idiotic attempts to bring Belfast
 city centre to a standstill in the lead-up to Christmas," he said.

 "What egotists like Bryson hope to gain by this type of action is
 baffling. A democratic decision was taken around the flag and no amount
 of protests is going to change that."

 Sinn Fein also caused some controversy earlier this week when it chose
 to reveal its written submissions. At the outset of the process in
 September, Mr Haass asked the talks participants not to make their
 positions public.

 Sinn Fein said that the decision to publish had been taken unilaterally
 in effort to foster debate. "We felt it was important to kick-start
 discussions in relation to these key issues," said negotiator Sean
 Murray.

 "We believe there should be a public dimension to the discussions
 because after all they are societal problems and not just down to the
 political parties."

 Other members of Sinn Fein delegation to the Haass Talks are Gerry
 Kelly, Jennifer McCann, and Mitchel McLaughlin.


----------------------------------------------------------------------


>>>>>> Alerts and hoaxes continue


 An apparent attempt to set fire to the offices of the Alliance Party
 offices in east Belfast was the most serious of a number of unclaimed
 alerts and incidents in Derry, Belfast and Armagh this week.

 The petrol-bomb attack on the office building at Upper Newtownards Road
 took place on Saturday night. Only one of the bombs ignited on the
 street, and it was quickly extinguished.

 The party has been targeted repeatedly by loyalists in the wake of a
 Belfast city council decision last year to put the flying of the British
 Union Jack at the city hall in line with other civic buildings under
 British jurisdiction.

 Alliance East Belfast MP Naomi Long, who has been subjected to death
 threats by loyalists, said the attempted firebomb attack on her party
 premises was an attack on democracy.

 "This is not an attack on an individual party or office. It is an attack
 on democracy," she said.

 A spate of pipe-shaped devices also caused alerts and evacuations across
 the North.

 A member of the public was reported to have picked up a device that was
 thrown at a PSNI patrol in Strabane, County Tyrone on Sunday. British
 army bomb-disposal experts officers later destroyed the object in a
 controlled explosion.

 The British army were also called to Andersonstown in west Belfast
 shortly before 9am on Tuesday after a suspicious device was discovered.
 They carried out an evacuation before it was removed "for further
 inspection". The PSNI said the object was another pipe device, but
 denied reports it had been thrown at one of their patrols

 Also on Tuesday, residents at Wall Street in north Belfast were also
 forced from their homes at around 3am following an alert. It was later
 declared a hoax. An alert at Musgrave Park in south Belfast was found to
 be an old wartime-type shell.

 And also on Tuesday, bomb-disposal experts were called to an alert and
 evacuation in Armagh, where they said a "viable explosive type device"
 had been made safe.

 On Thursday, an elaborate incident saw a bus driver ordered to take an
 object to Strand Road PSNI base in Derry. An oblong device was later
 recovered, although the PSNI did not say if it was viable. The driver
 was hailed as a hero by the PSNI after she drove the bus away from a
 built-up area.

 A number of security alerts also took place in Derry today [Friday] at
 the Gobnascale Road area of the city.

 Following evacuations, British Army bomb disposal experts attended all
 of the alerts at around 1am. Each was declared to be "an elaborate
 hoax". Another object was then spotted at a business premises on the
 Strabane Old Road, which also described as a hoax.


----------------------------------------------------------------------


>>>>>> Feature: 'Britain's Secret Terror Force'


 -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 An account by BBC investigative journalist John Ware on what he learned
 about "Britain's secret terror force", the Military Reaction Force.
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------


 10 pm, May 7 1972, Belfast: a 16-year-old youth emerges from a school
 disco with his girlfriend.

 Like many other youths in this part of Catholic, nationalist west
 Belfast, he had previously thrown stones at the British army.

 Suddenly there is a burst of machine gun fire from a car. As it speeds
 off, the boy writhes in agony from bullets in the stomach and arm. A few
 weeks later a car cruises into view of a bus stop. The driver is said to
 have waved a friendly wave, only for a machine gun to flame into life
 from a rear window, cutting down three men chatting to each other.

 Between May and September 1972 -- the most violent year of the conflict
 -- there were several similar 'drive by' attacks, which nationalists
 assumed were by loyalist gunmen.

 In fact the gunmen were soldiers in civilian cars, dressed up as locals,
 and sometimes armed like the local IRA -- with the IRA's favourite
 weapon, the 'Chicago grinder', a Thompson sub-machine gun also favoured
 by the 1920s gangster al Capone.

 In each case the soldiers claimed they were fired on. Yet there was no
 independent evidence to show that any of the dead or wounded were armed,
 or that they provoked the attacks, or even that they were members of the
 IRA.

 These soldiers belonged to an experimental undercover British army unit
 called the Military Reaction Force (MRF) whose mysterious activities
 have been the subject of lurid speculation in Belfast for 40 years.

 Ex-MRF members have generally shunned the limelight. So controversial
 were their activities that the force was soon disbanded.

 The closest former MRF soldiers have come to breaking cover is as the
 pseudonymous authors of two semi-fictionalised paperbacks, one of whom
 has referred to the MRF as a "legalised death squad".

 The factual account of the MRF may not be quite as colourful.
 Nonetheless, the evidence gleaned from seven former members,
 declassified files and witnesses does point to a central truth: that MRF
 tactics did sometimes mirror the IRA's.

 Co-located with the Parachute Regiment in Palace Barracks just outside
 Belfast, the MRF was shielded even from the view of their uniformed
 comrades by corrugated sheeting.

 Within the MRF compound were prefabricated units housing an operations
 and briefing room, an armoury and space for cars, typically Hillmans and
 Ford Cortinas with microphones built into their sun visors. Some were
 stolen. MRF members were selected from all regiments, including the SAS
 and Special Boat Service. They had to be single, and able to work
 unsupervised using their own initiative.

 Their main role was surveillance by melting into the background of
 nationalist west Belfast. To help them live this role, members were
 'demilitarised' on joining. First names were used instead of ranks.

 These soldiers did not lack for cold courage. By adopting a variety of
 disguises -- drunks, road sweepers, dockers and press photographers with
 fake press cards -- they ventured into IRA strongholds.

 Soldier E recounted how he posed as a merchant seaman in Ardoyne, a near
 suicidal act of courage in this IRA lion's den.

 Had he been banged up against a wall and his underarm Walther pistol
 discovered, torture and execution would have followed. "It was a hairy
 job and we used to get the shakes after it, but it had to be done," he
 said.

 The soldiers we spoke to also said the MRF had a "hard-hitting
 anti-terrorist" role. "We were not there to act like an army unit,"
 explained Soldier F. "We were there to act like a terror group."

 One tactic was to deliberately act as bait, to entice the IRA to come
 out to fight. "It was like dangling a red flag to a bull," said Soldier
 E, "to get them to engage you rather than their covert operations,
 laying ambushes and bombs etc."

 The bait -- typically -- was an unmarked vehicle with two soldiers in
 the front armed with pistols, and a third in the back seat with a
 sub-machine gun.

 "You'd have one [car] standing off and we'd put one as a decoy in such a
 place as they would come up to you," explained Soldier G. And if they
 did? "If they had weapons on them they were f***ing going down. That's
 the beginning and end of it."

 These baiting tactics were outside the rules governing the use of lethal
 force known as the Yellow Card, which required a soldier to challenge a
 gunman, offering him the chance to put down his weapon before opening
 fire -- unless the soldier felt his life was in imminent danger.

 In the real world of Belfast 1972, one man with a gun confronted by
 another was only ever going to end one way. All of the MRF soldiers we
 spoke to say they often ignored the Yellow Card. "If we didn't do what
 we did, nothing was going to get done," said soldier H, a grizzled SaS
 veteran.

 And in 1972, according to Anthony Le Tissiet, then a major in the Royal
 military police, the prevailing attitude was that "you could just about
 do anything you wanted".

 In this piratical climate, releasing a few enthusiasts on to the street
 and spontaneous events were bound to occur.

 "It was a time when we enjoyed the challenge of going out and having a
 fight," said Soldier H.

 "We had to break the rules in many cases but not so badly that, you
 know, there was murder done, or anything like that," said Soldier G.

 That depends how "murder" is defined, and for Soldier G shooting someone
 found with a weapon in a car -- even if it wasn't actually on him --
 doesn't seem to have qualified: "The rule of thumb was to take him in
 and get some information out of him, but we were sick of that sh*t, you
 know."

 What about "assassination" in its conventional meaning: a cold-blooded
 plan to identify, track down and execute a target?

 None of the MRF soldiers we spoke to say that they were given
 instructions to hunt down a named member of the IRA for execution.

 On the other hand, the MRF had an effective way of identifying known
 players. Attached to the MRF was the British army's first agent-running
 unit in Northern Ireland where captured members of the IRA were turned.

 Known as 'Freds', they were housed in married quarters on the base. They
 were taken out in armoured personnel carriers, and through its slit
 windows they identified members of the IRA who were then photographed.
 MRF patrols were sometimes tasked on the basis of intelligence provided
 by the Freds.

 Was there within the MRF, an understanding as to what would be
 permissible if some of these more active IRA players were spotted in
 circumstances where they could be dispatched?

 Soldier D sometimes patrolled with a silenced weapon. "We had to use our
 own initiative," he said. "That's why I was selected for this operation
 -- to use my own initiative."

 If he came across a "well-known shooter" who'd carried out
 assassinations and if the opportunity arose, he would be "taken out".

 By the start of 1972, according to the army, soldiers were "killing or
 wounding about 15 terrorists a week".

 It's impossible to say whether the MRF's contribution to that was
 disproportionately high in relation to its size of about 40 men.

 Many MRF soldiers are now dead, there were daily multiple shootings of
 unknown origin and the MRF's day-to-day records have been destroyed.

 However, some MRF soldiers do seem to have taken a trigger-happy
 approach to vigilantes manning barricades -- often amateurish affairs
 erected to protect nationalist enclaves from attacks by marauding
 loyalists.

 As potent symbols of insurrection, it fell to the army to discourage
 their presence.

 Soldier G admitted he and other MRF soldiers engaged in a "fair bit of"
 drive-by shootings -- provided he saw a weapon. "You just ease up, slow
 -- and spray a few."

 Some soldiers said they operated on the assumption that there would
 always be a weapon at a barricade --whether it could be seen or not.

 "We'd give 'em a blast anyway," said Soldier F, with the insouciance of
 someone blow-drying his hair.

 On the night of May 12 1972, an MRF patrol gave a few blasts of
 automatic and pistol fire to half a dozen men dismantling a barricade
 close to a loyalist area in south Belfast.

 Patrick McVeigh, a father of six children, died on the spot.

 The MRF soldiers told the Royal Military Police they'd been confronted
 by up to half a dozen gunmen who opened fire.

 Yet forensic tests on McVeigh and his friends were negative, nor were
 any of them in the IRA.

 A uniformed soldier quickly on the scene said: "We were under the
 impression we were dealing with ordinary guys trying to prevent trouble
 who weren't gunmen."

 Covering up the MRF's role, an army statement said the attack was a
 "motiveless crime" -- code for loyalist murder gang.

 Ten minutes earlier, the same MRF patrol car that had killed McVeigh had
 been in convoy with another MRF patrol car which had also opened fire on
 another barricade, wounding 19-year-old Eugene Devlin who was walking
 close by.

 Devlin was not a member of the IRA and he too tested negative for
 firearms. Again the MRF soldiers told the military police they came
 under fire. Devlin insists the only gunfire came from the MRF car.

 "We operated initially with them thinking that we were the UVF," said
 Soldier H. But to what end? "We wanted to cause confusion," said Soldier
 F.

 "My take on that was 'Great, no problem'," said Soldier H, who was
 "quite happy" for the IRA to think the UVF was responsible.

 Did some MRF soldiers also seek to exacerbate the murderous internal
 tensions amongst republicans by mimicking the Official IRA from whom the
 Provisional IRA had split in December 1969?

 Stored in the MRF's own armoury were two Thompson sub-machine guns, then
 a weapon popular with both IRA factions.

 One of the two Tommy guns was privately owned by Captain Hamish
 McGregor, one of the MRF's commanders, who had won a Military Cross in
 Aden.

 The other had been captured from the IRA by the police and then loaned
 with ammunition to the MRF by the Special Branch. The MRF had told the
 Branch that they needed the guns for training to familiarise their
 soldiers with the sound and characteristics of a standard enemy weapon.

 However, the Tommy guns appear to have had another use as well.

 We found a major who had told the Royal Military Police that, when
 patrolling his area, one of Captain McGregor's section leaders had
 sometimes been armed with a Thompson.

 His name was Sgt Williams, a Royal Military Policeman on attachment to
 the MRF and he had also been the commander of the MRF patrol that shot
 dead Patrick McVeigh.

 Soldier H told us that he too sometimes took out a Thompson on patrol
 because it had "hitting power and it felt better... it had a bloody big
 slug".

 Shortly after noon on June 22 1972 a volley of "bloody big slugs" from a
 Thompson hit three young men standing at a bus terminus on the Glen
 Road, west Belfast, and a fourth man whose bedroom was in the line of
 fire.

 According to one witness, a car slowed to a halt 20 yards away on the
 main road and the driver gave a friendly wave -- only for the black
 barrel of a Tommy gun to flame into life from the back seat.

 Once again, the gunman was Sergeant Williams.

 Soon word reached detectives that a plain-clothes army unit was
 operating in west Belfast with its own rules.

 "I thought there was some great master plan behind these guys driving
 about in plain-clothes cars, shooting at civilians," says Alan Johnson,
 then a detective constable. "If there was, it certainly escaped me. I
 couldn't quite grasp it, nor could any of my colleagues."

 Detective Inspector Bill Mooney couldn't grasp it either. The MRF
 patrol's version was that Williams had been armed that day with the
 army's standard issue machine gun, the 9mm Sterling. Yet surgeons had
 removed 0.45 calibre bullets from the victims.

 Eventually, the bullets were forensically matched to one of the two
 Thompson sub-machine guns in the MRF's armoury -- the one owned by MRF's
 last commanding officer Captain McGregor. Only then did Williams admit
 the truth -- that he had taken McGregor's Thompson from the armoury with
 him on patrol.

 Eventually Williams and McGregor were charged with illegal possession of
 a firearm and ammunition. Williams was also charged with three counts of
 attempted murder.

 That day the attorney-general, Sir Peter Rawlinson QC, is recorded as
 saying that McGregor's revelation that a Thompson sub-machine gun had
 been loaned by the Special Branch "might not be helpful" -- which was
 something of an under-statement.

 He also told the then secretary of state, Willie Whitelaw, that "the
 whole case was extremely embarrassing and might become more so" because
 the "blue Cortina car alleged to have been used" by the MRF in the Glen
 Road shooting" had figured in other alleged crimes."

 Sergeant Williams had indeed been involved in other controversial
 shootings, including the fatal shooting of Patrick McVeigh.

 Officials then came under attack from ministers for not having been
 forewarned of "potential stinkers" like the Williams case which had
 "burst upon the Ministry of De-fence".

 Why, ministers asked, had not "someone... pick(ed) up the potential
 dynamite in this particular case much earlier and warn us that it might
 be a particularly tricky one?"

 But army HQ Northern Ireland had -- they just hadn't known how to defuse
 it which presumably explains why HQNI had not been "particularly
 helpful" and why the MoD in London was anxiously awaiting "what position
 would be adopted by the defence".

 Particular concern was expressed about something in one of McGregor's
 formal statements described by the army deputy under-secretary as
 "horrific", warning of its "possible implications".

 We can't say what so "horrified" him -- our Freedom of Information
 request for the statements was refused.

 The firearms charges against McGregor and Williams were dropped.

 Williams alone now faced trial charged on three counts of attempted
 murder. In London, the MoD scrambled around for "any legitimate
 diversionary tactic that might help" distract the press from identifying
 the MRF.

 There was "considerable advantage in maintaining as much confusion as
 possible".

 In the event, at his trial Williams did admit to the MRF's existence,
 but the damage to the army was significantly limited because the illegal
 firearms charges against him and McGregor had been dropped.

 As a result of that, whatever explanation there might have been as to
 why Williams had a Tommy gun on patrol never emerged in court.

 Williams told the court the only reason he had the Thompson with him was
 that he'd been on a firing range demonstrating it to new MRF recruits --
 not an explanation we understand he offered the police.

 Nor did the jury hear evidence from the major who'd spoken about knowing
 that Williams had been armed with a Thompson on previous patrols.

 After a brief trial, Williams was acquitted on all counts by a majority
 verdict.

 Both Williams and McGregor were eventually promoted -- McGregor ending
 his army career in 1998 as a brigadier, and Williams as a captain.

 On September 27 1972, three months after the Glen Road shooting, another
 MRF patrol shot dead 18-year-old Daniel Rooney, telling the police he
 was armed with a rifle.

 His friend Brendan Brennan, who the MRF said was armed with a pistol,
 was wounded.

 Declassified papers show that the army briefed the secretary of state
 Willie Whitelaw that Rooney was a "volunteer in D Company, 1st Btn IRA"
 and that Brennan belonged "to the same gang as Rooney".

 These claims are no more credible than the MRF soldiers' claims that
 their targets were armed.

 As before, the swabbed hands and clothes of both youths showed no sign
 of having been in contact with firearms, consistent with eyewitness
 accounts that neither was armed.

 Rooney does not appear on any IRA roll of honour, he is not buried in
 the republican plot in Milltown. There were no IRA death notices and his
 family and friends insist to this day he was not in the IRA; nor is
 there any evidence that Brennan was either.

 When I called at the home of the soldier who shot Rooney he said that if
 I set foot on his "property again I'll punch you... and I can punch
 pretty hard".

 In November 1972, a review of the MRF ordered by the army top brass
 found there was "no provision for detailed command and control" and said
 it should be replaced by a better-trained unit, which eventually morphed
 into 14 Intelligence Company.

 Prime Minister Edward Heath sent a message to the army emphasising that
 "special care should be taken" to ensure that the new unit should
 "operate within the law".

 An implicit recognition, perhaps, that some MRF soldiers' activities had
 been illegal?

 The head of the army, General Sir Michael Carver, said the new training
 arrangements would "automatically reduce the risk of nonsenses".

 Yet what had been the military logic behind those "nonsenses"? And why
 exactly had MRF soldiers sometimes been armed with IRA-style weapons?

 In 1993, the RUC began a lengthy inquiry into the MRF's shooting of
 Patrick McVeigh.

 Interviewed at his retirement home in Spain was the MRF's first officer
 commanding, a Parachute Regiment captain, Arthur Watchus, who had also
 served in the SAS:

 POLICE: Did you have knowledge of what weapons were
 being used in the car by patrols? How disciplined a unit was it?

 WATCHUS: It was a disciplined unit but what they (his soldiers) did away
 from me, who can say?

 Watchus is now dead. So I asked his successor Captain Hamish McGregor if
 he had authorised Williams to take his privately owned Tommy gun on the
 day when Williams fired it at three men the police believed were
 unarmed.

 McGregor declined to say but insisted the only reason that the MRF had
 Tommy guns in its armoury was for training, describing Williams as one
 of "our very experienced and respected operators" and pointing out that
 he answered to 39 Brigade, Belfast.

 Commanding 39 Brigade for most of 1972 was Brigadier 'Sandy' Boswell,
 who ended his career as Lt Gen Sir Alexander Boswell, General Officer
 Commanding, Scotland. Did the MoD's verdict that there had been "no
 provision for detailed command and control" mean that lethal MRF
 operations were not under proper control? Boswell declined to respond.

 Williams emigrated to Australia where we caught up with him. Opening his
 door, a burly, vested figure barked "I'm not interested" and then
 promptly closed it when I began to ask questions.

 Meanwhile, McGregor wrote to say he ran "a pretty tight ship" with
 proper control over his men. He also complained that by publicising the
 claims of some of his former soldiers we were dignifying
 "unsubstantiated and fanciful theories".

 Hunting down IRA members to shoot them would have been against the law
 and his soldiers had abided by the Yellow Card. He "remained very proud
 of the pioneering work we carried out in what was a very hazardous
 environment".

 The MRF's work was indeed hazardous and pioneering. It was the prototype
 for more sophisticated army undercover units that penetrated and
 disrupted IRA active service units, reconciling the IRA leadership to
 the reality that an "armed struggle" would never force a British
 withdrawal from Northern Ireland.

 As to 'death squads' -- a label paradoxically shared by nationalists
 with long memories and one of the two former MRF soldiers turned author
 -- Soldier D said: "I totally reject 'death squad'," only to pause and
 add: "Put yourself in my situation: we've got a dirty war, a war that
 was out of control. We knew who the operators were, we knew who the
 shooters were. So what are you going to do about it, John?"

 Soldiers are not policemen. They are required to close on the enemy and,
 if necessary, to kill them, even if innocent bystanders are in their
 midst.

 Some in the MRF seem to have had particular difficulty in distinguishing
 one from the other, inflicting grave damage to the reputation of the
 British army which could otherwise take credit for having fought -- and
 won -- an asymmetric war against terrorists.

 Asked about the allegations that unprovoked, MRF soldiers shot unarmed
 civilians, the Ministry of Defence said it had referred them to the
 police in Northern Ireland.

 Thirty years of conflict has a long tail.


----------------------------------------------------------------------


>>>>>> Feature: Address to 32 County Sovereignty Movement Ard Fheis


 ----------------------------------------------------------------------
 The following address was delivered to the annual conference of the 32
 County Sovereignty Movement by National Chairman Francis Mackey
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------


 The two great challenges that face Irish republicanism today are
 relevance and our ability to deliver it. These represent challenges
 because they involve change and reorganisation. This is the theme I wish
 to address to you for the forthcoming year.

 I want this years Chairman's Address to take the form of a series of
 challenges; basic challenges as to where we are, where we need to go and
 how we are to get there. I want you to understand that republican policy
 is sometimes best served by robust examination and sometimes least
 served by blind pursuit.

 Each year this annual address follows a given format, revolutionary
 greetings to comrades and friends, solidarity greetings to families of
 the fallen and the imprisoned and an expression of gratitude to our
 members and supporters for their diligent and selfless work throughout
 the year.

 I want to depart somewhat from that format by injecting a dose of
 realism and directness to all the above categories by paying them the
 pragmatic respect of involving them in addressing the challenges I will
 outline.

 Before I outline these challenges I want you to consider two guiding
 principles within which your considerations of these challenges should
 be guided.

 The first of these principles is this: Every generation of Irish people
 has the right to fight for the ending of the violation of their national
 sovereignty according to their own ingenuities and in the political
 contexts they find themselves. That means us here today.

 The second of these principles is that our right to national
 self-determination is not predicated on our people determining that our
 analysis and vision of a United Ireland must have their prior agreement.
 The right to choose involves the right to reject. That means their right
 to accept or reject us.

 The key point here in both principles is relevance: our relevance as a
 force to end the violation of our national sovereignty today and our
 relevance as an argument to ensure that an expression of national self
 determination can determine a more just future for our people tomorrow.

 Either way we are key players on this stage because we have chosen to be
 here but only if we recognise that being right is simply not enough,
 that being historically true is simply not enough and that being
 ideologically pure is simply not enough. We must be relevant before we
 can influence and we must be influential in order to secure change.

 REPUBLICANISM TODAY

 Where republicanism stands today is not where republicanism ought to be.
 We are in the shadow of yet another partitionist agreement which is
 floundering every day and yet republicanism is not positioned to fill
 the ever increasing vacuum left in its wake.

 Our people had the honest expectation that peace and justice would flow
 from Good Friday. They are entitled to this, but yet republicanism finds
 itself cast as the enemy of their peace and no matter how astute our
 political analysis was in predicting the failure of that process what we
 have to offer in providing that peace is still viewed as a violent
 negative.

 This is largely due to republicans being seen as perpetual critics,
 obstructionists to any efforts that fail to satisfy the ghosts of
 republican history. In our people's minds our definition of progress is
 a simple homage to historic events as opposed to a dynamic to shape
 events yet to come.

 The answer to this negativity cannot be found in the past. The very act
 of seeking it there reinforces the people's belief in this negativity.
 The simple truth is that our vision and proposals for a sovereign united
 Ireland are deemed irrelevant by the very people we hold this vision
 for.

 This goes to the heart of the challenges I alluded to earlier. The
 seminal republican document outlining a republican blueprint for a
 United Ireland is Eire Nua and its subsequent addendum Saol Nua. And
 though both are visions of great merit the basic truth remains that both
 are more associated with a republican split in the mid eighties than
 they are with what they intended to be.

 Can we honestly say that any debate on Eire Nua will not inevitably lead
 back to a debate on that split? Isn't it a fundamental truth that
 republican debates on a United Ireland lead back to a century ago as
 opposed to a moment yet to dawn? And this epitomises the problem:
 republicans believing that all our debates must have a retrospective
 trajectory, that atoning for the past is more important than planning
 for the future. It's a disastrous failure. And the people have every
 right to reject us for that alone.

 Good Friday is in very real danger of collapsing. Republicanism as it
 stands does not represent a political force to be reckoned with in the
 event of this collapse. We are seen as fragmented, reactionary, poised
 to say 'we told you so' but offering no realistic prospect of delivering
 change.

 We have made our objections to Good Friday. We have done so on the
 proper grounds and in the proper forum. We have no need to anchor
 ourselves to a perpetual rehashing of these objections. Our task now is
 to formulate our alternatives in the positive context in which they
 belong, our inalienable right to self determination.

 We have spoken much on republican unity. We have drafted discussion and
 position papers to assist this project. We have outlined the logic of it
 and the necessity of it. We have convened public meetings so that our
 support base could take part in this debate. We have done so in the
 absence of any reasoned or presented counter argument against such
 unity.

 The greatest obstacle to the necessity of republican unity is our
 obsession with the past. And for anyone who voices opposition to it,
 irrespective as to their reasons why, we issue this challenge to them;
 give us an argument that looks forward? Do not tell us that political
 inertia is a principled position. Do not confuse sticking to principles
 with principles that are stuck. Do not argue the spurious notion that
 the reasons for our existence are rooted in the past. Do not try and
 tell us that mere existence is a political activity.

 We cannot claim to act on behalf of the sovereignty of the Irish people
 knowing full well that such acts are not the best we can offer. How can
 we promote with any sincerity our political vision knowing full well
 that our actions in their pursuit are not in themselves sincere because
 we know them to be less that one hundred percent?

 If we are rightly to be judged by our actions then we are doing a grave
 disservice to our objectives.  The challenge ahead is to end this
 contradiction.

 ORGANISATION

 Before we seek to influence political change we must first examine our
 own organisational abilities to do so. What we aspire to and what we can
 do are not one and the same.

 And before we address organisational abilities we must first address the
 abilities and expectations of the individual republican. This is
 possibly the greatest challenge of all.

 Challenge yourselves today; what am I doing that I can do better? What
 more can I do? What do I need to learn before I can advance?

 In today's environment the individual republican holds more
 responsibility than their counterpart twenty years ago. Every republican
 with a mobile phone can speak to the world in an instant. It is an
 awesome power, the true dread of which lies in not understanding it.

 This demands of all republicans an acute awareness that a real
 discipline is required when it comes to membership of a republican
 organisation. It's not enough to know who the Hunger Strikers were, or
 who signed the Proclamation or who died in such an operation.

 Each republican needs to be well versed in current republican policy,
 both in its content and in the various strategies employed to advance
 them. You need to know your role in this organisation and you need to
 understand how this organisation can only function because of that role.
 You are the most important cog in this machine: ALL your actions and
 pronouncements impact on the organisation as a whole.

 The recruitment bar needs to be set high, the continuing membership bar
 set even higher.

 How should we organise ourselves? What sort of movement should we be?
 How should our organisation function?

 The party political model for Irish republicanism has failed. The
 political party known as Sinn Fein is the only political party in
 Ireland to have negotiated and signed two partitionist treaties with the
 occupying power. Out of that political party has evolved further
 partitionist groupings such as Fianna Fail and Provisional Sinn Fein. It
 is the nature of a party based political organisation to conform to the
 party political system which defines it.

 Party politics is parochial politics. Parochial politics is the death
 knell for a national movement.  It is a universal error to believe that
 abstentionism from such a political system is the antidote to this
 conformity or that practicing such abstentionism preserves revolutionary
 identity. It does neither because abstentionism needs to be a
 revolutionary activity and not a negative political position.

 Becoming a political party negates abstention from a party political
 system. Adopting such a position merely reinforces the fact that the
 very system you claim to reject is the same system you have allowed to
 define you.

 Republicans need to move away from the negative connotations of
 abstentionism and begin to promote the positive alternative of a
 distinct and revolutionary engagement within our communities. The
 challenge that faces us is not to stay outside of their system but to
 build the system that will replace it. This is not an exercise in
 resurrecting ghosts nor does it need ghostly approval. We are here, this
 is now and our communities deserve our full attention just as we require
 theirs.

 This will not be achieved with an abstract argument or a historical
 homily. It will require functioning structures that know how to
 cooperate and communicate. We need to demonstrate to our communities
 that political change is not the preserve of the establishment nor
 dependant on being part of that establishment. And if we can guide our
 communities to achieve change for themselves we will have made the most
 powerful argument for their ability to secure national change.

 That is the essence of the idea of republican relevance.

 POLITICAL PROGRAMME

 There is no social utopia nor utopian method of achieving one. A
 political programme is not a list of aspirations but a plan of action
 based upon our abilities to pursue and implement them. And this is the
 key point; the effectiveness of our political programme is wholly
 dependent upon the willingness of our members to make themselves more
 effective.

 A political programme does not originate from the nameless and faceless
 in a backroom but from the abilities of our members acting in an
 organised way. The less you are effective the lesser effective our
 political programme will be. There is no escaping the logic of this
 truism.

 Our message to our communities is that sovereignty matters. The
 objectives of our political programme are to demonstrate that by acting
 in a sovereign capacity, individuals and communities can effect change
 for the better. As republicans we want to see this action translated
 into national change. We want our community activism deeply rooted in
 our pursuit for the restoration of our national sovereignty.

 The current economic and financial crisis has taught us some very
 telling lessons. To squander these lessons with a rant against
 capitalism is to miss the lessons it is teaching us. Where was socialism
 when capitalism was in crisis? Is this a mirror image of where is
 republicanism when Good Friday is in crisis?

 And just as we are perceived as being negative so too is socialism.
 Socialism is indelibly linked with failure. It is linked to
 dictatorship, censorship, social enslavement and economic deprivation.
 We may not like to hear these truths; we may prefer our rants against
 capitalism but the absence of any meaningful expression of socialist
 discontent on the streets in the midst of this crisis speaks volumes.

 And we can immerse ourselves in abstract debates on the history of
 socialism and pat ourselves on the back when we invent a new ism as a
 comfort blanket but we do so at the cost of even further isolation.

 We cannot build a political programme predicated on having to explain
 failure. We cannot go into our communities offering change on the back
 of outdated slogans. We cannot resurrect past conflicts as a means to
 make our solutions look more relevant than what they actually are for
 today's problems. We either take our objectives and policies into
 modernity or we go home. No more glorious defeats. No more keeping the
 flame aglow. No more workers utopia. No more populist electoralism.

 FORMULATING POLICY

 I want to draw your attention to our initiative on drug abuse entitled
 Addressing the Drugs Crisis, A Paradigm Shift in the Republican
 Approach. I'm not using the chairman's address to argue its merits or
 not, that is properly the function of the delegates to debate  openly at
 this Ard Fheis. I want to draw your attention to its structure.

 There is no doubt that drug abuse is a huge problem in every community
 in Ireland. It is a problem republicans cannot ignore nor approach in an
 ill thought through capacity. It's far too serious an issue for that.

 Republicans have always taken a stern line on drug dealing. The death of
 Volunteer Alan Ryan is testimony to this. But his death is also a wake
 up call that republicans must take a realistic approach to policy making
 that reflects both a basic logic and a pragmatic appraisal of abilities
 and resources.

 The initiative begins with an impartial and critical look at the nature
 and extent of the problem. It does not present the problem so it
 dovetails into a pre-existing solution. It examines current approaches
 to dealing with it and outlines the conclusions of those approaches. In
 similar vein it scrutinises republican efforts and thinking and applies
 a critical review of those also. It examines experiences in other
 countries and outlines the initiatives they have taken and details the
 results thereof.

 From this detailed analysis it proceeds to formulate a working policy
 which republicans can carry into their communities as part of a national
 political programme.

 Irrespective of whether you agree with the conclusions or not the
 salient point is that the drafting of a policy in such a format allows
 us to make a more informed decision either way.

 This is the mechanism that republicans must employ when formulating
 policy on any matter. Policing, organisation, finance, elections,
 republican unity all deserve our full and critical attention if we are
 to be effective in dealing with these crucial matters.

 In conclusion I want to reiterate that the year ahead must be about
 grasping these challenges and moving republicanism forward. They are
 challenges for individual members and our movement as a whole. Each
 requires the other. Each needs to play their part.

 Beir Bua!

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